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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Medicare is a federal health insurance program created in 1965 for all people age 
65 and older, certain younger people with disabilities, and people with end-stage renal 
disease, regardless of income or medical history. Medicare now covers over 50 million 
Americans.  In 2013, Medicare spending was $585 billion, a 6.17% increase from $551 in 
2012 (Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Medicare Baseline May 2013, April 2014), and 
accounted for 16.7% of total federal spending and 21% of total national health spending. 
Medicare spending is expected to continue growing due to an aging population and the 
rising costs of health care per person.  
Medicare offers all enrollees a defined benefit with four different parts that help 
cover specific services. Part A, also called hospital insurance, covers inpatient services 
provided by hospitals as well as skilled nursing and hospice care, and accounted for 47% 
of benefit spending in 2013. Part B, also called medical insurance, covers services 
provided by physicians and other practitioners, hospitals’ outpatient departments, and 
suppliers of medical equipment, and accounted for 42.9% of benefit spending in 2012. 
Part A and Part B together are called traditional Medicare, which is run by the 
government. The MMA of 2003 added a voluntary prescription drug benefit beginning in 
2006 under Part D, and 10.6% of Medicare spending now goes toward the Part D drug 
benefit. Last but not least is Medicare Part C, also called the Medicare Advantage Plan, 
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offered by private companies that contract with Medicare to provide all Part A and Part B 
benefits, as well as prescription drug coverage. 
The Medicare program currently provides two distinct choices to beneficiaries: a 
government-run traditional Medicare (TM) plan, sometimes called Medicare fee-for-
service, and a private health plan known as Medicare Advantage (MA). Medicare 
Advantage plans originated with the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) 
as managed health care. The first MA plan was available to Medicare beneficiaries in 1985. 
Since then, MA plan enrollment has grown rapidly, leading to higher penetration rate and 
more competition among health care providers. This program has gone by several names 
over the past 30 years. It was first introduced as Part C (compared to Part A and Part B in 
Medicare). Then the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 renamed it “Medicare+Choice.” 
Next the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003 renamed it “Medicare Advantage 
(MA).” Currently, MA includes health maintenance organization (HMOs) plans, local 
preferred provider organization (LPPOs) plans, regional preferred provider organization 
(RPPOs) plans, private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans, special needs plans (SNPS), and several 
other plans. The HMO plans, PPO plans and SNP plans are together called Medicare 
Advantage Coordinated Care Plans (CCPs), because they all offer health care through an 
established provider network approved by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS). 
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Improving hospital quality has always been an important goal for policy makers. 
As a rapidly growing and relatively new program, the quality of MA plans as compared to 
traditional Medicare program has been studied by many health economists in recent 
years. Studies not only measured the quality of the MA plan itself, but also how the 
development of the MA program affects patients under traditional Medicare and even 
with private insurance. Patients covered by MA plans and TM plans are treated in the 
same hospitals, using the same medical equipment, and by the same physicians. Thus to 
accurately evaluate the rapidly expanding MA enrollment, we should not only measure 
the quality of hospital care received by MA enrollees, but also the quality of hospital care 
received by patients under TM plans.  
This dissertation evaluates some of the indirect effects, known as “spillover 
effects,”  of the expansion of MA plans on the quality of care delivered to those who 
remain with traditional fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare.  More specifically, I examine the 
spillover effects related to how the expansion of managed care changes the 
characteristics and delivery of hospital care, e.g., the quality of care received, by those 
traditional FFS beneficiaries, while keeping all other variables constant (Chernew et al., 
2008). Most previous studies have examined the spillover effect based on the cost of care, 
and it is widely accepted that higher managed care penetration can lead to less Medicare 
expenditure. Little is known, however, about the effect of the expansion of managed care 
on the quality of hospital care received by traditional Medicare beneficiaries.  
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Though lower health care expenditure is one goal of Medicare reforms, 
researchers and policy makers worry about whether reducing medical expenditures will 
reduce the quality of health care. Reduction in spending for patients may be the result of 
reducing services. If those services were necessary for good health, the quality of care will 
decline. Alternatively, the quality of care might rise in low expenditure areas if the 
spending reductions result from reducing unnecessary or inappropriate services. It is 
urgently important to determine whether spillover effects are related to quality, and if so, 
how. 
In recent years, the government has been revising the policies related to MA plans, 
especially to the program’s structure and plan payment methods, not only to improve the 
availability of private plans, ease of plan enrollment, and reducing unnecessary 
expenditures, but also to improve the quality of health care. For example, the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has been trying to adopt a different payment 
approach for managed care to reduce Medicare expenditures, as well as encourage more 
enrollments. CMS is also paying more attention to care quality by rewarding hospitals 
that deliver higher quality and higher value health care. As part of the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), CMS also began in October 2012 to penalize hospitals with excess readmissions (as 
measured by dividing a hospital’s number of “predicted” 30-day readmissions for heart 
attack, heart failure, and pneumonia by the number “expected,” based on an average 
hospital with similar patients). Thus it is extremely important to evaluate the direct and 
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indirect impact of the expansion of MA plans on the quality of hospital care, in order to 
design a more efficient MA program. 
Considering that reducing readmission can simultaneously improve quality and 
reduce cost, I will use the readmission rate as the measurement of quality. Some 
readmissions may be unavoidable because of patient- and community-level factors 
outside the hospital’s control. However some readmissions could be avoided by the use 
of more advanced equipment and more experienced physicians, or by coordinating timely 
follow-up care. Those preventable readmissions may result from a medical error or 
adverse event during hospitalization, or the lack of efficient follow-up care or accurate 
communication following treatments. Readmission rate is thus a logical indicator to 
measure the quality of hospitals.  
This study will address the need for more empirical evidence on quality 
performance in relation to the MA plans’ penetration during the period of 2006 to 2009. 
Specifically, I examine whether there is a spillover effect from the penetration of 
Coordinated Care Plans (CCPs) on the traditional fee-for-service sector, by using the 30-
day readmission rate as the hospital quality indicator. Because managed care penetration 
is potentially endogenous, I use county-level payment rates from CMS to managed care 
plans as instruments. Using recent data, I found a substantial spillover effect from the 
expansion of managed care plans that will increase the quality of inpatient care received 
by traditional fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries. 
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In this paper, section 2 provides background on the development of Medicare 
Advantage plans. Section 3 is a brief review of prior studies of the spillover effect of 
managed care. In section 4, I develop an econometric model to determine the 
relationship between quality and MA penetration. In section 5, I introduce the data 
resource and explain the model, and also develop my hypotheses on the relationship 
between MA plans’ penetration, as well as the competition and quality of traditional FFS.  
Section 6 presents the empirical analysis and solves related issues. Section 7 is the 
conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
In 1965, Congress created Medicare to provide health insurance to people age 65 
and older, regardless of income or medical history. Since then, the Centers for Medicare 
& Medicaid Services (CMS) administer Medicare, and has contracted with private 
insurance companies to behave like intermediaries between the government and medical 
providers. Since the 1970s, Medicare beneficiaries have had the option to enroll in private 
health plans (at first, only health maintenance organizations [HMOs]), as an alternative to 
the federally administered traditional Medicare program. Traditional Medicare has lower 
administrative costs and offers enrollees an unconstrained choice of health care providers,  
but it lacks incentives to coordinate care and encourage providers to provide higher 
quality care (e.g., lower readmission rate and mortality rate) (MedPAC, 2014).  
The MA program was introduced in the hope that managed care in Medicare 
could be more efficient with lower cost and higher quality, considering the success of 
managed care in the commercial insurance market. To attract more enrollees while 
reducing costs (which has been proved to be hard to arrive), MA payment policy has 
evolved since the program first originated with the TEFRA 1982. The average MA 
payment increased from $250 in 1990 to more than $800 in 2014, and could be as high as 
$1,500 around 2010 (see Figure 1). This payment increase during the last three decades 
not only relates to increasing health care costs, but is closely related to CMS payment 
policies, because CMS wants to use MA payment structure and program parameters as an 
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efficient tool to directly affect MA plans and enrollees and may indirectly affect the entire 
health care system. Much of the rationale for the current MA program is based on the 
premise that MA plans can provide care of higher quality and lower costs than the TM 
system, and that this efficiency will enable more generous benefits at a lower premium, 
which can finally reduce government deficit at healthcare spending.  
Prior to the passage of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act, Medicare used formal risk 
adjustment, setting a per-member per-month payment for each beneficiary. MA plans 
were paid by a capitation set at 95 percent of expected Fee-for-Service (FFS) spending in 
the beneficiaries’ county, for the purpose of reducing cost compared to TM plans. 
However, this 5% lower payment than FFS did not save the government money. Instead, 
the government lost money due to adverse selection: the plans attracted enrollees who 
were considerably healthier than the average Medicare enrollee (Nicholas, 2009; CMS 
1999). Despite paying plans only 95 percent of the beneficiary’s expected costs, adverse 
selection in Part C resulted in an estimated 5 to 7 percent overpayment (CMS 1999).  
To reduce overpayments to Medicare Advantage plans, increase choices available 
to Medicare beneficiaries, and address perceived regional inequities caused by payment 
rates, the Congress passed the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) and introduced a new 
payment regime. The BBA broke the direct link between the growth in county fee-for-
service spending and Medicare managed care payment, and the plans were paid the 
highest of three annual rates per beneficiary per month: (1) a minimum floor payment 
9 
 
 
that began at $367 in1998 and was to be adjusted annually (floor rate was increased by 
its estimate of the current year’s national growth rate of Medicare fee-for-service 
spending, minus a statutory reduction of 0.5 percentage point through 2002); (2) a 2 
percent increase from the county’s prior year rate;  or (3) a blend of county-specific and 
national average rates, if a so-called budget-neutrality condition was met (MedPAC 1999; 
Nicholas, 2009; McGuire et al., 2013). The blended payment for a county is a weighted 
average of the adjusted updated local rates and the input price adjusted national rate.  
To satisfy the budget neutrality condition in a particular year, the Health Care 
Financing Administration (HCFA, now called CMS) compared the projected total 
Medicare+Choice spending, if county rates were based on the highest of the floor, 
minimum update, or blended rates, with the payment based on local rates only. This 
requires that total Medicare+Choice spending, including blended payments, equals what 
would be paid if only local rates had been used.  If projected total spending was not equal 
to projected spending based on local rates, HCFA would multiply the blended amounts by 
a factor to satisfy the budget neutrality condition. The blended rate was designed to 
reduce the variation in payments across the country by lowering the highest rates and 
increasing the lowest rates.  
During this period, Medicare continued to lose money on those beneficiaries who 
enrolled in MA plans. On the one hand, for those non-floor counties that do not apply 
floor payment, the 2 percent cap on payment increases effectively decreased Part C 
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reimbursement. On the other hand, Medicare paid more for Part C enrollees in any floor 
county. Because the growth in spending in the FFS Medicare program over that period 
was higher than 2 percent, more counties were considered as floor counties. In 1998, 
when there was one national floor, only 12 percent of beneficiaries lived in floor counties. 
While in 2001, after the introduction of a higher urban floor for counties within 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) with at least 250,000 people, 46 percent of 
Medicare beneficiaries lived in floor counties. This updated floor payment rule increased 
the health plans’ overpayment. What was worse, to keep hospitals and doctors in their 
networks, the plans had to pay market rates. As a result, those counties that applied the 2 
percent cap reduced the number of plans. The MC program was thus not successful in 
expanding plan option choice to Medicare beneficiaries in general, and the BBA was not 
successful in bringing new choices to areas that had lacked Medicare risk plans. 
To solve the problem of decreasing plan participation and declining enrollment in 
MA plans, the Republican-led congress passed the 2003 Medicare Modernization and 
Improvement Act (MMA), effective March 2004, to increase payments across all areas. 
Under MMA, Medicare calculated a benchmark based on the highest of four amounts: (1) 
an urban or rural floor payment; (2) 100 percent of risk-adjusted traditional Medicare FFS 
spending in the county (calculated using a five-year moving average lagged three years); 
(3) a minimum update over the prior year rate of 2 percent or traditional Medicare’s 
national expenditure growth rate, whichever was greater; or (4) a blended payment rate 
update (McGuire et al., 2013). 
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Since 2006, the MMA started a bidding process for plan payment. Private plans 
submit bids indicating the per capita payment for which they are willing to offer Part A 
and Part B coverage to Medicare beneficiaries. Plan payment rates are determined by the 
MA plan “bid” and the “benchmark” in the payment area. Benchmark, which is the 
maximum amount of Medicare payment set by law for an MA plan to provide Part A and 
Part B benefits, varies depending on the counties the plans serve and where they draw 
their enrollment. Counties called “floor” counties are given higher benchmarks to 
increase plan availability and have benchmarks that average 120 percent of FFS spending. 
For non-floor counties, benchmarks are set at an average 112 percent of FFS spending 
(Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 2009).  
There are two payment floors: a general floor applicable to all counties, and a 
higher “urban” floor, which applies to counties in metropolitan areas with more than 
250,000 residents. If a plan’s bid was greater than the county-level benchmark, enrollees 
were required to pay a monthly premium which equals the difference between the 
benchmark and the bid price. If the bid was lower, 75 percent of the difference was to be 
returned to enrollees in the form of supplemental benefits, the other 25 percent was 
returned to the Medicare program (McGuire et al.,2013; KFF, 2012). Because benchmarks 
are often set above the cost for Medicare to provide benefits to similar beneficiaries in 
the FFS program, MA payment rates usually exceed FFS spending. The Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission (MedPAC) reports that, on average (weighted by plan enrollment by 
county to estimate overall averages and average by plan type), 2010 MA benchmarks will 
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be 117 percent of spending in Medicare’s traditional FFS programs, bids will be 104 
percent of FFS spending, and payments will be 113 percent of FFS spending. 
In response to the MA payment levels being significantly above traditional 
Medicare, the 2010 health reform, known as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (PPACA), gradually phases down Medicare plan payments to bring them closer to the 
average costs of Medicare beneficiaries. Plan payment rates are still determined by the 
MA plan bid and the payment area’s benchmark. Under PPACA, MA benchmarks for 2011 
were frozen at 2010 levels for each county. Beginning in 2012, benchmarks began to 
transition to a system in which each county’s benchmark will be a certain percentage in 
2017. Specifically, for counties in the quartile with the lowest FFS costs, benchmarks will 
be 115 percent of fee-for-service costs per enrollee. For counties in the quartile with the 
highest FFS costs, benchmarks will be 95 percent of fee-for-service costs per enrollee 
(MedPAC 2011). The transition from old benchmarks will be complete by 2017, at which 
time the average base payment will be about 101.5 percent of FFS. 
Along with the different payment policies to MA plans, enrollment in Medicare 
Advantage plans is closely related to the size of the payment. Total MA enrollment has 
expanded rapidly over the past three decades (see Figure 2). At the 1985 launch of the 
Medicare HMO program, only 2% of beneficiaries enrolled, but the number enrolled in 
MA plans increased steadily until the M+C program was adopted as part of the BBA of 
1997. After 1997, growth in enrollment in managed care plans slowed to a maximum 6.3 
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million enrollees in 1999. Enrollment continued to decline by about 27% by 2003 when 
new Medicare policies came into effective to encourage more participation in MA plans. 
These policies boosted federal funding to stabilize and expand the program, and in 2006 
introduced Medicare drug benefits and authorized regional MA plans. Since then, MA 
plans have become more attractive because of the convenience of a single plan covering 
all Medicare benefits, a cap on out-of-pocket spending, and an effective information 
campaign. In 2013, 14.5 million, or 28 percent, of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in a 
Medicare Advantage plan, an increase of about 1 million over 2012 enrollments. This 
number is projected to increase slowly to 25 million beneficiaries by 2024 (CBO, April 
2014).  
Since 2006, MA enrollment has doubled (see Figure 3), and plans project overall 
enrollment growth in 2014 of 3 to 5 percent (MedPAC 2014). In recent years, the share of 
enrollees under HMO plans has increased slowly, while the number of Medicare 
Advantage enrollees in both local and regional PPOs has grown rapidly, and enrollees in 
PFFS plans first increased rapidly then rapidly shrinking after 2010.  In 2013, enrollment in 
HMO plans increased by 10%, to nearly 10 million enrollees, enrollment in local PPO plans 
grew about 11% to 3.3 million enrollees, and enrollment in regional PPO plans increase by 
16% to 1.1 million enrollees. This strong growing trend does not apply to PFFS in recent 
years. With fewer limitations than other MA plans impose on doctors and hospitals (such 
as no network restrictions), PFFS was extremely attractive to beneficiaries, especially 
among Medicare recipients who travel frequently. However since 2011, PFFS plans have 
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generally been required to establish networks, a change that makes PFFS less attractive to 
Medicare beneficiaries and led to a sharp decline in PFFS enrollment.  
Differences in the enrollment and growth trends of the four most popular MA 
plans result from different regulations and requirements by CMS. HMO enrollees must 
generally get non-emergency care and services from doctors or hospitals in the plan's 
network, and they require a referral from their primary care doctor to see a specialist. If 
they are treated out-of-network, they must pay all or most of the costs.  
To reduce the restrictions patients must meet for HMO plans and make health 
care more convenient, PFFS and local PPO were authorized in the BBA 1997, while 
regional PPO was added into the MA family in MMA 2003 and was first available to 
enrollees in 2006. Compared to HMOs, PPO plans are more flexible; no primary care 
physician is required. Out-of-network services, however, are charged at a higher out-of-
pocket cost than in-network services. PFFS did not require a provider network, so 
beneficiaries are free to choose any doctor, but Medicare providers may refuse to treat 
them, constraining beneficiary access to services. The Medicare Improvements for 
Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA), required as of 2011 that all employer-
sponsored PFFS plans have a network of contracted providers for enrollees in each county 
of operation, while allowed enrollees to ask other providers if they will accept PFFS 
payment. 
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The expansion of enrollment in MA plans provides the incentive to encourage 
insurance companies and managed care plans to contract with CMS to offer Medicare 
Advantage plans in specific geographic areas (see Figure 4). As of February 2014, there 
were 571 MA contracts, including 556 local Coordinated Care Plans (CCPs, including HMO, 
local PPO and SNPs or Special Needs Plans) contracts, and 12 PFFS contracts. The increase 
in the number of contracts in recent years increases the overall plan availability. Since 
2006, virtually all Medicare beneficiaries have had access to at least one Medicare 
Advantage plan (see Figure 5). In 2014, 95 percent of beneficiaries had access to network-
based local CCPs, 71 percent had access to a regional PPO, and only 53 percent had 
access to a PFFS plan. From 2007 to 2010, all beneficiaries, whether in rural or urban 
areas, had access to at least one PFFS plan. This declined to 63 percent in 2011 when the 
network building requirement was applied, and continued to decrease between 2013 and 
2014, from 59 to 53 percent of beneficiaries. 
Generally, HMOs, local PPOs and regional PPOs are classified as coordinated care 
plans (CCPs) because they all include a network of providers contracted to deliver the 
benefit package approved by CMS to ensure all requirements are met, including access, 
availability, and quality. PFFS plans are not classified as CCPs because originally they did 
not have provider networks. In this research, I divide Medicare Advantage plans into two 
parts: CCPs that require a network of providers, and PFFS that do not require a network. 
The spillover effect of the expansion of CCPs and PFFS will be evaluated in the following 
sections.  
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, I first review the mechanisms through which spillovers may be 
occurring, and then review the existing literature examining the spillover effects of the 
expansion of managed care on the quality of patients enrolled in traditional FFS plans. 
Lastly, I will review the limitations of present literature and the contribution of my 
dissertation. 
3.1 Mechanisms of Spillover Effects 
Some researchers point out that the expansion of managed care plans may 
negatively impact the care of traditional FFS enrollees through the following mechanisms: 
First, greater managed care market share may make it more difficult to access 
hospital care due to high demand and short-run inelastic supply. An unsatisfactory 
performance on process-of-care measures, which record the percentage of patients who 
receive appropriate care for specific conditions, is usually considered an indicator of low 
quality hospital care. Litaker et al. (2003), in a 1998 cross-sectional survey of households, 
found that individuals residing in areas with more managed care were 28% more likely to 
report problems obtaining care than those living elsewhere. 
Second, spillover effects may occur through a negative impact on the investment 
in infrastructures, such as the density of hospitals, beds or available services over time, 
and the adoption of advanced medical technology. HMO providers are often assumed to 
have highly elastic demand, so high managed care penetration will force managed care 
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providers to compete with each other, which makes HMO plans successful in negotiating 
lower prices with providers (Baker and Phibbs, 2002). Furthermore, lower prices require 
managed care providers to reduce cost, most likely by reducing the number of specialists, 
and thereby the number of specialists’ services provided (Baker 2001; Heidenreich et al. 
2002); by encouraging more conservative practice patterns (Baker 2001); or by slowing 
the timing of adopting more advanced but costly technologies (Culter and Sheiner 1998; 
Baker 2001). Because hospitals’ resources are shared by all patients, both managed care 
beneficiaries and traditional FFS enrollees, fewer advanced technologies not only affects 
the quality of managed care plans, but also patients under traditional FFS plans. 
For example, Chernew (1995) used Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) 
data from 1982 and 1987, and showed that a 10 percent increase in the non-IPA HMO 
penetration rate leads to a 4.8 percent to 5.6 percent drop in beds per capita. Baker and 
Wheeler (1998) find that high HMO market share is associated with low levels of MRI 
availability, by using data from a nationwide census of 3,705 MRI sites conducted by 
Technology Marketing Group (TMG) in late 1994 and early 1995. Mas and Seinfeld (2008) 
reveiwed annual data from 5,390 U.S. hospitals from 1982-95 regarding the adoption of 
13 different technologies, and found that managed care has a negative effect on hospitals’ 
acquisition for each of the 13 medical technologies.  
Third, higher managed care penetration may discourage high quality hospitals 
from entering the Medicare market. Gold, Hurley, Lake, et al. (1995) surveyed 138 
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managed care plans by telephone, found a careful selection of physicians by all plans, and 
concluded that managed care plans have complex systems for selecting, paying, and 
monitoring their physicians. Based on this conclusion, Mukamel, et al. (2001) deduced 
that as managed care takes more market share, plans have the power to place financial 
and administrative burdens on providers, which may lead high-quality providers to find it 
less profitable to stay in the FFS market because of lower market share, or accept HMO 
beneficiaries because of lower prices reimbursements.  High-quality providers may thus 
leave such a managed-care dominated market, and their selective exit would affect the 
quality of medical care of both managed care and traditional Medicare patients. 
On the other hand, as most recent researchers have found, a higher managed care 
penetration rate is more likely to have a positive spillover effect on the quality of health 
care received by fee-for-service patients through the practice patterns mechanism. 
Managed care can influence physicians’ practice patterns, because of different payment 
methods from traditional Medicare patients. As practice patterns changes, they are likely 
to apply to across all patients, even if the changes are responses to managed care 
incentives. For example, as Glied and Zivin (2002) pointed out by using the data from the 
1993-1996 National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS), more than 25 percent of 
traditional FFS patients were treated by physicians with more than 20% of patients 
covered by Medicare HMO plans. Similarly, the average Medicare HMO patient visited a 
physician whose patient panel was over one-fourth traditional FFS. With proper 
regression models, they concluded that physicians who treat mostly HMO patients 
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appear to adopt an equivalent practice style along most measurable dimensions (like 
duration of visit, number of tests and medications ordered, and scheduling of return 
visits).  
Spillovers may also occur in the opposite way through the adoption of technology. 
Increased HMO penetration will increase the insurer’s ability to obtain better quality 
information about providers for its enrollees. In another paper, Glied (2000) pointed out 
that managed care plans must have the capacity to collect and transfer administrative 
data within an internal market. This information collection capacity gives hospitals the 
incentive to increase quality in order to attract customers. Baker and Phibbs (2002) 
analyzed hospital development of neonatal intensive care units (NICUs) using data from 
the American Hospital Association surveys 1980 to 1996 (except 1981 when no survey 
was conducted), and concluded that higher HMO market share will lead to slower 
adoption of mid-level care units, but not affect the adoption of the most advanced high-
level units. More patients will benefit from advanced technology equipment because they 
do not have the choice but to use more expensive but more effective technology. 
3.2 Managed Care Penetration Affects the Traditional FFS Sector 
A large amount of empirical literature seeks to test the relative performance of 
MA and TM, considering the fast growth of MA plans in recent years. The most recent 
study supports the hypothesis that MA plans have been outperforming TM plans. Because 
Medicare beneficiaries, whether enrolled in MA plans or TM plans, will share the same 
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hospitals and be treated by the same doctors, the question remains whether the higher 
quality of MA will spill over into the traditional Medicare sector. The spillover effect from 
MA plans has been widely studied since the first HMO plan became available in 1985. It 
was an especially hot topic in the 1990’s, when the government decided to continue 
supporting Medicare Advantage plans, leading to an expansion of MA plans. There are 
essentially two approaches to measure this spillover effect: expenditure and quality.  
3.2.1 Spillover Effect on System-Wide Expenditures 
Much literature examines the spillovers between managed care plans (mostly 
HMOs) and "system-wide expenditures," (expenditures in all sectors of the health care 
system, including Medicare and non-Medicare (Baker 1997). The evidence for managed 
care penetration affecting system-wide expenditures is consistent; most studies conclude 
that increased HMO penetration is associated with decreased overall hospital spending. 
Little or no evidence suggests that more enrollments in managed care increase spending 
(Baker 2003). Gaskin and Hadley (1997) researched all nonfederal hospitals in the 84 
largest MSAs in the country from 1985-1993, and found that hospitals in areas with high 
rates of HMO penetration had a slower rate of expense growth (8.3%) than hospitals in 
low penetration areas (11.2%). 
3.2.2 Spillover Effect on Medicare-Specific Expenditures 
Meanwhile, a number of studies examine evidence of the spillover effects of HMO 
penetration on Medicare-specific expenditures, mostly the expenditure of traditional FFS 
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beneficiaries. Baker (1997) analyzed 1986-1990 county- and MSA- (metropolitan 
statistical area) level data, and found that Medicare FFS expenditure has a concave 
relationship with managed care market share, reaching a maximum at HMO market share 
between 0% and 10% and decreasing thereafter. Another study by Baker (1999) found an 
increase in HMO market share from 10 to 20% will decrease Medicare FFS expenditures 
of Part A by 2% and Part B by 1.5%. Using data from the annual Cost and Use ﬁles of the 
Medicare Current Beneﬁciary Survey (MCBS) for 1994–2001, Chernew, DeCicca and Town 
(2008) conducted instrumental variable models to correct for the endogeneity of HMO 
penetration changes across counties, and found that a 1% point increase in county-level 
Medicare HMO penetration is associated with a nearly 1% reduction in individual-level 
annual spending by fee-for-service enrollees. 
As it becomes widely accepted that higher managed care penetration can lead to 
lower Medicare expenditure, both researchers and policy makers are concerned that 
reduced medical expenditures will reduce the quality of health care. Because Medicare’s 
prices are set administratively, reductions in spending on patients must result from a 
decrease in services. If reduced services are necessary, quality of care will decline. 
Alternatively, quality of care might improve in low expenditure areas if reduced spending 
results from reductions in unnecessary or inappropriate services. Thus it is important and 
urgent to determine the spillover effect, not only by measuring expenditures, but also by 
measuring quality. 
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3.2.3 Spillover Effect on System-Wide Quality 
To resolve this issue and fill the knowledge gap, the spillover effect of the 
expansion of managed care on the quality of health care has been extensively discussed 
in recent years. Unlike measuring expenditures, measuring quality in the health care 
sector is extremely difficult, mainly because quality has numerous dimensions. No single 
variable can capture all the factors to measure the quality of each hospital.  
Instead, three criteria have been used by previous researchers to measure quality 
(Sari, 2002): (1) input quality as measured by the number of specialists, adoption of 
specific technologies like MRI, and hospital staffing levels (Kaestner and Guardado, 2008); 
(2) process quality as measured by number of tests performed, access to care, admissions 
for conditions that could be prevented through timely and effective treatment (Nicholas, 
2009), and length of visit times with physicians (Decker 2007); and (3) outcome quality as 
measured by effectiveness of care, patients’ satisfaction with care (Hellinger, 1998; Shen 
and Zuckerman, 2005; Brunt and Jensen, 2012), readmission rates, and mortality rates 
(Mukamel et al., 2001).  
Some literature tests the impact of managed care penetration on system-wide 
quality, but conclusions about the effect of managed care penetration on the quality of 
care in the early literature are mixed. Blendon et al. (1998) found in 1997 survey data that 
45 percent of Americans believe managed care decreased the quality of care they 
received. Mobley and Magnussen (2002) examined how managed care penetration 
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affected hospital efficiency by using excess staffing in California hospitals in 1995 as the 
quality indicator, but they did not find a significant relationship between managed care 
penetration and nurse staffing ratios. Using national birth certificate data for 1996, 
Hueston and Sutton (2000) found HMO penetration was unlikely to influence national 
cesarean section rates. 
Escarce et al. (2006) used six medical conditions as quality indicators in California, 
New York, and Wisconsin from 1994 to 1999, and found that higher HMO penetration 
was associated with lower mortality rates in California but higher mortality rates in New 
York. Baker and McClellan (2001) analyzed a cohort of newly diagnosed cancer patients in 
1992–94 (derived from Medicare claims files), and concluded that managed care is 
associated with increased diagnosis rates, which could indicate better screening and 
better preventive care,  usually indicators of higher quality. 
3.2.4 Spillover Effect on the Quality of Medicare 
Due to limited data, only a small amount of literature provides evidence that 
managed care can influence the care provided to individuals in fee-for-service plans 
through a spillover mechanism. Mukamel et al. (2001) used 1990 data from 1,927 
hospitals in 134 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) with five or more acute-care 
hospitals to investigate the associations between HMO market penetration, HMO 
competition, and the quality of care received by Medicare fee-for-service patients. In 
their study, risk-adjusted expected mortality rates are used to measure the quality of 
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each hospital’s service. They claim that HMO penetration is negatively associated with 30-
day post-admission mortality rate.  
Heidenreich et al. (2002) examined the care of 112,900 fee-for-service Medicare 
beneficiaries admitted with an acute myocardial infarction from February 1994 through 
July 1995 to determine the relationship between managed care market share and the use 
of recommended therapies for those beneficiaries with acute myocardial infarction. Their 
results showed that patients with traditional fee-for-service care, living in areas with high 
managed care market share, were more likely to be treated with beta-blockers and 
aspirin, which commonly considered as appropriate treatment, than those who were 
residing in areas with low managed care market share. Meanwhile, Meara et al. (2004) 
studied how managed care market share affects the proportion of fee-for-service 
Medicare beneficiaries admitted for acute myocardial infarction (AMI), using a sample of 
206,450 Medicare beneficiaries included in the Cooperative Cardiovascular Project (CCP). 
They used logistic regression to examine the association between managed care market 
share and the use of angiography and concluded that an increased market share of 
managed care at the county level is negatively related to the use of coronary angiography 
in AMI patients enrolled in traditional Medicare plans. 
Dowd et al. (2011) used sample selection methods that correct for observed 
covariates and found that HMO enrollees have lower mortality than beneficiaries in 
traditional fee-for-service Medicare. By studying the use of services and quality of care for 
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beneficiaries in 2009, Afendulis, Chernew and Kessler (2013) also found that the 
expansion of MA plans can reduce beneficiaries’ rates of hospitalization and mortality. In 
another paper, Baicker, Chernew and Robbins (2013) used changes of the MA payment 
policy to isolate exogenous increase in MA enrollment and trace out the effects of greater 
managed care penetration on hospital utilization and spending, and they found that great 
managed care penetration is not associated with fewer hospitalizations, but is associated 
with lower costs and shorter stays per hospitalization. 
Meanwhile, Keating et al. (2005) studied a sample population diagnosed with 
breast or colorectal cancer during 1993-1999, using fixed effects regression analysis to 
evaluate whether county-level increases in the market share of managed care over time 
are related to the quality of cancer care, as measured by several quality indicators. They 
concluded that an increase in the market share of managed care has limited or no effect 
on the quality of care received by patients in the fee-for-service sector. 
3.3 Research Gaps and Contributions  
Despite the fact that great attentions have been paid by more and more 
economists in this area, the existing literature on managed care suffers from several 
limitations. First, due to data availability, most of the previous literature relied on data 
before MMA 2003. Payment methods have changed significantly since MMA, however, so 
results from the outdated data may no longer be referential. Conclusions based on this 
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limited data may lead to inaccurate or incorrect recommendations to current Medicare 
policies. 
Second, most studies included only information about HMOs. Even though HMOs 
take the largest share (65%) of Medicare enrollees, regression results from HMO 
penetration may not be generalizable to all managed care (Mukamel et al., 2001). As 
mentioned earlier, the number of Medicare Advantage enrollees in both local and 
regional PPOs has grown rapidly in recent years. Because different plan types within 
managed care organizations have different arrangements with physicians and hospitals, 
leading to different incentives and responses, the result may be different outputs for 
managed care enrollees and traditional fee-for-service enrollees. 
Third, most previous research has been unable to address the adverse selection 
problem that arises because the health of persons who choose an HMO may differ 
systematically from those who do not choose an HMO. Some economists have 
demonstrated that persons who have formed strong relationship with their physicians, 
usually less healthy enrollees who need to visit physicians frequently, are less likely to join 
a managed care plan in which they might not be able to keep their current physician 
(Hellinger 1998). If healthier individuals systematically enroll in Medicare HMO plans, the 
quality of health care for those remaining in the fee-for-service sector, which is usually 
measured by patient readmission, in-hospital mortality, post-30-day hospital mortality, 
and hospital-acquired infections, will be lower in counties with high HMO penetration, 
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even though there is no spillover effect by managed care penetration. Thus, if selection 
bias is not controlled for, the spillover effect is likely to be underestimated. Evidence from 
early studies indicated that favorable selection persisted through the late 1980s and early 
1990. Riley, et al. used 1994 data from MCBS, and found that HMO respondents were less 
likely to report fair or poor health after controlling for demographics. Cao and McGuire 
(2003) found two different effects between FFS plans and MA plans: a positive related 
spillover effect and negative related selection effect.  They used Medicare data for 1996 
to estimate the correlation between the HMO market share and the average FFS costs for 
different health care services, finding that when the HMO market penetration rate is 
below 15%, the selection effect dominates the spillover effect. The spillover effect starts 
to dominate the selection effect as the HMO share increases to above 18%.  
Other recent studies found that there might not be a selection issue when a 
proper methodological approach is used.  Mello et al. (2003) used 1992–1996 data from 
MCBS and found no significant association between favorable HMO selection and HMO 
market penetration. Chernew et al. (2008) also used data from MCBS, and found no 
systematic evidence of selection effects after estimating models with the largest set of 
health status controls. Without a consistent conclusion regarding adverse selection, 
assuming that there is no adverse selection might lead to biased estimators and incorrect 
conclusions. 
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Forth, unobserved heterogeneity may also bias the estimation. There may be 
unobserved, time-varying county level characteristics that are correlated with both 
managed care penetration and quality of FFS, such as consolidation in the provider 
market or changes in employer demand (Chernew et al 2008). To correct for this potential 
bias, an instrumental variables (IV) approach is usually applied. Some authors use county-
level payment rates from CMS to HMOs as instruments to identify the effect of county-
level Medicare penetration (Town and Liu 2003; Gowrisankaran and Town 2006; Chernew 
et al. 2008; Nicholas 2009). Since large employers are more likely than small employers to 
offer their employees a choice of insurance plans, including the choice to enroll in 
managed care plans, some authors prefer to use a cut-off for firms of 100 or more 
employees per capita in the HAS as the instrument variable (Bokhari, 2009), or the 
average number of employees per firm in the corresponding MSA (Mas and Seinfeld, 
2008; Baker and Brown, 1997). 
This paper contributes to the literature on the spillover effect of managed care 
penetration in four main ways. First, it examines more recent data than prior studies. This 
study updates the literature on spillover effect through 2009, whereas most previous 
studies only looked at the 1990s. Second, by using the MCBS data, it can calculate 30-day 
readmission rates as the quality measure, which is the same indicator used by CMS to 
compare the quality of hospitals and determine the payment.  Third, the analysis of 
market penetration is conducted at the county level and focused only on counties located 
in metro areas, which is a better estimate of the market than using the MSA level or 
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including all counties. Fourth, the data contain information on area characteristics and 
economic characteristics, such as unemployment rate, which allows careful control of 
market structure and economic fluctuation.   
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CHAPTER 4: ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
This section develops an econometric model to find the connection between the 
quality of traditional Medicare and the penetration of Medicare advantage plans.  
4.1 Basic Model 
The basic model is designed to find the spillover effect of MA expansion on the 
quality of care patients received under traditional Medicare at the county level. 
Specifically, the model measures the hospitalization of beneficiary i in hospital k located 
in county j, as a function of MA penetration in county j, the health and demographic 
characteristics of beneficiary i, hospital k’s characteristics, county j’s characteristics and 
year fixed-effects. The equation looks like: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡𝛼1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛼2 + 𝑍𝑗𝑡𝛼3 + 𝐻𝑘𝑡𝛼4 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡𝛼5 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡                (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the dependent variable to measure the hospital quality, and in this study it 
is a binary variable with value 1 if the beneficiary i had a hospital readmission in hospital k 
in county j in year t, and 0 is there is no readmission; 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡  is the MA 
penetration rate in county j in year t, which equals the number of enrollees over the 
number of Medicare eligible; 𝑋𝑖𝑡  is a vector of individual characteristics (including age, 
race and risk, etc.); 𝑍𝑗𝑡 is a vector of area time varying characteristics (including measures 
of area-level population demographics and economic conditions, like median household 
income, unemployment rate, mortality rate, etc.); 𝐻𝑘𝑡  is a vector of hospital 
characteristics (including hospital ownership, teaching status, hospital size, etc.); 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 is 
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a vector to control year effects (my research will cover the period of 2006-2009). My 
analytic sample is restricted to all MCBS respondents at age 65 and older with traditional 
Medicare (both Part A and Part B) for the entire year or enrolled in traditional Medicare 
until death in that year. 
This regression model requires careful analysis since the disturbance term 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 in 
Equation (1) is likely correlated with penetration of county-level Medicare Advantage 
plans, which will cause the problem of endogeneity. This endogeneity issue was pointed 
out and tested by health economists in the penetration study of Medicare Advantage 
plans. There may exist other variables that could be related to both the quality of hospital 
care and the penetration rates of MA plans, such as the market power and quality of each 
hospital. It is possible that Medicare Advantage plans tend to enter counties with higher 
traditional fee-for-service spending because of a higher Medicare payment rate. (As 
mentioned earlier, the calculation of the MA payment is positively related to traditional 
FFS spending in recent years.) Counties with higher traditional fee-for-service spending 
are also more likely to own more advanced medical equipment, hire  more experienced 
physicians, and provide higher quality health care. In this case, the estimation of 𝛼1 is 
expected to be biased upwards. If the true value of 𝛼1 is negative, the estimation of the 
marginal effect will be biased toward zero. 
This potential bias can be corrected by using the instrumental variables (IV) 
approach. In a linear model, the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator method is the 
32 
 
 
most popular and widely used approach to solve the problem brought by endogenous 
explanatory variables. In the 2SLS method, the endogenous variables are first regressed 
on all the exogenous variables including the instruments, and then the predicted value of 
the endogenous variable is used in place of its actual value in a regression. Since in my 
model, quality is measured by a binary variable, 2SLS could not be used to estimate the 
model. In this nonlinear regression model, two estimation methods have been widely 
used to address endogeneity: two-stage predictor substitution (2SPS), and two-stage 
residual inclusion (2SRI). (In the following sub-section, the two methods are explained in 
detail.) Terza et al. (2008) examined the two estimation methods, and concluded that 
2SPS is generally an inconsistent procedure, while 2SRI produces consistent estimates of 
the structural equation parameters. Thus 2SRI will be used in this study to solve the 
problem of endogeneity. 
4.2 Econometric Method 
To estimate the spillover effect, I will construct a Probit model with a set of 
instrumental variables. I deﬁne 𝑦𝑖 as an observed binary variable: the outcome to be 
explained. Let 𝑥𝑖 be a vector of observed regressors, and β a corresponding coeﬃcient 
vector, with e an unobserved error. The Probit model can be written as 
𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝑒𝑖            𝑦𝑖 = 1[𝑦𝑖
∗ > 0],                               (2) 
where I use the notation 1[.] as the indicator function to define a binary outcome. If some 
of the explaining variables are endogenous, 𝑋𝑖 could be divided into 𝑋𝑖
𝑒, which is a 1 × 𝑁1 
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vectors of endogenous variables and are possibly correlated with 𝑒𝑖, and 𝑋𝑖
𝑜, which is a 
1 × 𝑁2 vectors of exogenous variables. Then I can rewrite the model as 
𝑦𝑖 = 1[𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖
𝑒𝛽𝑒 + 𝑋𝑖
𝑜𝛽𝑜 + 𝑒𝑖 > 0]                                       (3) 
𝑋𝑖
𝑒 = 𝑍𝑖𝜋1 + 𝑋𝑖
𝑜𝜋2 + 𝜎𝜀𝜀𝑖                                                       (4) 
(
𝑒𝑖
𝜀𝑖
) | 𝑍𝑖~𝑁 [0, (
1 𝜌
𝜌 1
)  ]                                                         (5) 
where 𝑍𝑖 is is a 1 × 𝐾 vectors of instrumental variables. The instrumental variables must 
satisfy the following three conditions: (1) they cannot be correlated with the error term 𝜀𝑖 
in Equation 4; (2) they must be partially and sufficiently strongly correlated with 𝑋𝑖
𝑒 after 
controlling for all of the other independent variables; and (3) they can neither have a 
direct inﬂuence on 𝑦𝑖 nor be correlated with the error term 𝑒𝑖 in Equation 3. Further, the 
Probit model assumes that  𝑒𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖 have a joint standard normal distribution. If 𝜌 ≠ 0, 
𝑒𝑖 and  𝜀𝑖 are correlated, which can prove that X𝑒 is endogenous or misspecified, and it is 
correlated with 𝑒𝑖. In that case, the instrumental variables approach is recommended to 
run the regression model and get the unbiased estimated parameters.  This relationship 
will be used later to test the endogeneity assumption. 
There are two ways the model can be estimated to solve the endogeneity problem. 
One method is called two-stage predictor substation (2SPS), the other is called two-stage 
residual inclusion (2SRI). Estimation by 2SPS is a straightforward extension of the popular 
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linear two-stage least squares (2SLS) to nonlinear models from the simple linear model. In 
the first-stage, obtain consistent estimators of the vector 𝑋𝑖
𝑒 by estimating Equation 4 as 
𝑋𝑖?̂? = 𝑍𝑖𝜋1̂ + 𝑋𝑖
𝑜𝜋2̂                                                               (6) 
After getting 𝑋𝑖?̂? in Equation 6, in the second-stage, β = [𝛽𝑒  𝛽𝑜]  can be estimated 
in Equation 7 by substituting 𝑋𝑖
𝑒 𝑏𝑦 𝑋𝑖?̂? into Equation 3 using nonlinear least squares 
methods. 
𝑦𝑖 = 1[𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖?̂?𝛽𝑒 + 𝑋𝑖
𝑜𝛽𝑜 + 𝑒𝑖 > 0]                                           (7) 
With 2SRI methods, the first-stage of 2SRI estimator is identical to that of 2SPS, 
which is to estimate Equation 6, but the residuals need to be calculated and saved for use 
in the second stage. The residual is calculated as 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖̂ = 𝑋𝑖?̂? − (𝑍𝑖𝜋1̂ + 𝑋𝑖
𝑜𝜋2̂ )                                           (8) 
In the second-stage of 2SRI the set of variables 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖  are added to Equation 
3 as additional regressors, i.e., using nonlinear least squares method to estimate β =
[𝛽𝑒  𝛽𝑜] 
𝑦𝑖 = 1[𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖
𝑒𝛽𝑒 + 𝑋𝑖
𝑜𝛽𝑜 + 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖̂ 𝛽𝑟 + 𝑣𝑖 > 0]                            (9) 
where 𝑣𝑖 is the regression error term. The reason estimation bias can be removed with 
the 2SRI method is because by adding the residual terms into Equation 9, those omitted 
variables that are both correlated with 𝑦𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑋𝑖
𝑒 are controlled in the regression model 
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by adding the set of variables 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠. Thus, the endogeneity issue of  𝑋𝑖
𝑒 would cease 
to exist, and unbiased estimators can be concluded. 
Since the relationship between the quality of beneficiaries under traditional 
Medicare and penetration of Medicare Advantage plans is the primary focus of this 
research, it is important to determine how much the penetration of MA plans could affect 
care quality. However, the values of β = [𝛽𝑒  𝛽𝑜] calculated from 2SPS and 2SRI don’t 
imply much beyond the signs of the estimators. Instead, the estimated marginal effects 
can be a better determinant of the spillover effects.  
Under the Probit model specification, the joint normality of 𝑒𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖 implies that 
the conditional distribution of 𝑒𝑖 given 𝜀𝑖 is also normal as follows 
𝑒𝑖| 𝜀𝑖~ 𝑁(𝜌𝜀𝑖 , 1 − 𝜌
2)                                                      (10) 
Therefore, the response probability for 𝑦𝑖 can be derived as: 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖) = 𝑃(𝑦𝑖
∗ > 0|𝑋𝑖) = 𝑃(𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖
𝑒𝛽𝑒 + 𝑋𝑖
𝑜𝛽𝑜 + 𝑒𝑖 > 0|𝑋𝑖)
= P[𝑒𝑖 > −(𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖
𝑒𝛽𝑒 + 𝑋𝑖
𝑜𝛽𝑜)|𝑋𝑖] 
= Φ (
𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖
𝑒𝛽𝑒 + 𝑋𝑖
𝑜𝛽𝑜 + 𝜌𝜀𝑖
1 − 𝜌2
).                                                 (11) 
If 𝑥𝑖
𝑒  is a continuous variable, its partial effect is obtained from the partial 
derivative: 
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𝜕𝑝(𝑋𝑖
𝑒)
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑒 = φ (
𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖
𝑒𝛽𝑒 + 𝑋𝑖
𝑜𝛽𝑜 + 𝜌𝜀𝑖
1 − 𝜌2
) ∗
𝛽𝑒𝑗
1 − 𝜌2
         (12) 
Because Φ(∙) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of continuous random 
variables, φ(∙) is a probability density function. In the Probit model,  φ(∙) > 0. Thus, the 
partial effect always has the same sign as 𝛽𝑒𝑗 (Wooldridge, 2010). 
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CHAPTER 5: DATA SOURCE AND DESCRIPTION 
The main data source in this study is the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 
(MCBS) for the years 2006 to 2009, a period concurrent with the introduction of Part D 
and regional PPOs, and before the implementation of the ACA. This was a period of fast 
growth in MA plans enrollment, and changes in many features of managed care. The 
MCBS is a continuous, multipurpose survey of a nationally representative sample of aged 
and disabled Medicare beneficiaries sponsored by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (CMS). The MCBS uses a rotating panel design. There are four panels active at 
any given time and each panel has approximately 4,000 sample participants. New panels 
are introduced each year in the fall round and replace the oldest panel. A key feature of 
the survey is its longitudinal design. Currently, each sample person is interviewed three 
times a year over four years.   Two data files from the MCBS are released in the annual 
Access to Care and Cost and Use files. Additional information on the MCBS can be found 
at the CMS website (www.cms.gov). 
Another important data source is CMS research data bank, including county-level 
payment and enrollment for each plan for 2006-2009. Monthly enrollment data comes 
from the Monthly MA Enrollment by State/County/Contract data file, which provides the 
stated information for all organization types except Prescription Drug Plans (PDP) and 
employer-direct PDP organizations. County-level eligible Medicare beneficiary data is 
drawn from the MA State/County Penetration data file. County-level payment rates come 
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from the Medicare Advantage Ratebook data file.  These data were obtained from the 
CMS website (www.cms.gov) under the Research, Statistics, Data & Systems section. 
The third data source is the AHA (American Hospital Association) Hospital 
Database, compiled from the AHA Annual Survey of hospitals. It includes each hospital’s 
information in four aspects: organizational structure, facilities and services, total 
utilization and staffing, and supplemental information. In this study, hospital level 
information is used from 2006 to 2009, including the locations of hospitals, facilities and 
services, beds, utilization, and staffing.  Further information about the AHA annual survey 
is available at the AHA website (www.aha.org) and all data is purchased from AHA. 
The last data source is the 2012-2013 Area Health Resources Files (AHRF). The 
AHRF is a family of health data resource products, collected from more than 50 sources, 
and provides county-level economic and demographic information by year (such as 
unemployment rate, population density, and median household income), as well as 
county-level health statistic information (such as the number of specialists, mortality rate 
and total hospital beds). Further information is available at the Health Resources and 
Services Administration website (www.ahrf.hrsa.gov). 
In this study, all penetration rates, MA payment, and area characteristics variables 
are measured at the county level, but includes only counties located in metropolitan 
statistical areas (MSAs). The reasons why I exclude rural counties are because first, many 
rural counties offer only a limited number of managed care plans or even no MA plans, 
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which can cause results that use all county level measurement to be susceptible and 
biased; second, most rural counties have small numbers of residents, which leads to a 
smaller amount of enrollment in MA plans, and insufficient sample size in small counties 
may lead to inaccurate regression; and third hospital behavior in small counties may 
differ from hospital behavior in large urban areas, specifically, hospital markets located in 
counties in metro areas are more likely to be characterized as monopolistically 
competitive markets, whiles hospital markets in rural counties may resemble oligopoly or 
monopoly markets.  
There are 1101 counties located in metro areas out of a total 3250 counties. As 
Table 1 shows, more than 90% of all HMO enrollees live in metropolitan areas; about 84% 
of local PPO enrollees and 76% of regional PPO enrollees come from MSA areas. Thus, the 
sample of urban counties can represent all counties very well and it is logical to focus this 
study sample on counties located in urban areas.  
Other studies have been based on the MSA level instead of county level, because 
the MSA level measures a larger and more reasonable market since patients may choose 
hospitals within the metro area instead of the county either for convenience or quality.  
However, there are at least two limitations to choosing MSA as the measurement 
unit in this research. First, this study will use payments to Medicare Advantage plans from 
CMS as the instrument variables, but the payments are calculated at county level by CMS. 
Any method to aggregate the payment to the MSA level may lead to bias. Second, Meara 
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et al. (2004) claimed that there exists considerable heterogeneity in the level of market 
share of managed care within MSAs, and this may be related to the smaller number of 
MSAs and the relatively less variation among MSAs (Jiang et al, 2013). Thus, using a 
county-level measure of market share allows the capture of this variation in the analyses.  
The unit of observation is the Medicare beneficiary individual level, and the 
analytic sample is restricted to MCBS respondents age 65 or older enrolled in traditional 
Medicare (both Part A and Part B) for the entire year.  Individual characteristic and MA 
market fixed-effects are included to remove bias that might result from time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity across hospitals and counties.  
5.1 Dependent Variable 
The purpose of this research is to measure how the quality of hospital care 
received by patients under traditional Medicare plans is affected by the penetration of 
Medicare Advantage plans. Quality of health care always plays an extremely important 
role in monitoring health systems and is a critical factor in evaluating and comparing 
hospitals. This study uses available data to focus on readmissions within 30 days of 
discharge as an indicator of health care quality. The dependent variable is a binary 
variable, which equals to 1 if the patient gets readmitted within 30 days after discharge 
from a hospital. This indicator is particularly related to hospital quality to those of 65 
years of age and older. The quality indicator is constructed by using the annual Cost and 
Use file of the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) for elderly respondents 
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excluding patients under age 65 years (i.e., those entitled to Medicare because of 
disability).  
The 30-day readmission measures are estimates of unplanned readmission for any 
cause to any acute care hospital within 30 days of discharge. It is often used to evaluate 
overall hospital performance since readmission may be caused by errors in hospital or 
premature discharge prompted by pressure to vacate hospital beds. Both causes can lead 
to readmission and could be avoided. Patients may be readmitted to the same hospital or 
to a different hospital for the same condition or for a different reason. Even though 
readmission for the same condition is a better measurement of the previous hospital care, 
it can be difficult to restrict the readmissions to the same condition since the new 
condition may be caused by improper treatment of original condition. This study will thus 
use same and different condition readmission rates. 
Readmission within 30 days was measured, rather than a longer or shorter period, 
because readmissions over longer periods may be influenced by factors outside hospitals’ 
control, such as other complicating illnesses, patients’ own behavior, or care provided to 
patients after discharge. Readmissions over shorter periods are more likely to be affected 
by patients’ own disease or physicians’ advice. To conduct a robust test, this study will 
also measure 60-day and 90-day readmission rates to test whether the spillover effect is 
sensitive to the number of days. 
42 
 
 
Table 2 shows the average 30-day readmission rate is about 22% in this study 
sample, while the 60-day readmission rate is 29% and the 90-day readmission rate is 
about 31.8%. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 required CMS to 
establish a Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program in Medicare FFS to reduce Inpatient 
Prospective Payment System (IPPS) payments to hospitals that have excess readmissions. 
CMS also sponsored the Partnership for Patients in 2011 to reduce readmission rates of 
traditional FFS Medicare patients by 20% between 2010 and the end of 2013. 
5.2 Explanatory Variables 
The dependent variables fall into four groups: MA penetration, county 
characteristics, patient characteristics (including risk adjusters), and hospital 
characteristics. 
5.2.1 Market Penetration of Plans 
The first and most interesting group includes the penetration rates of MA plans. In 
this study, managed care penetration at the county level is the share of the Medicare 
eligible population in the county enrolled in managed care in a given year. For example, 
the HMO penetration rate in Wayne County in 2006 is calculated as the number of 
Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in HMOs in 2006 divided by the Medicare eligible 
population in Wayne County. CMS has monthly MA enrollment data by 
state/county/contract from October 2006 available online. Because this research period is 
from 2006 to 2009, October data is used to represent 2006, and June is used for the 
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remaining years. CMS, however, has the monthly data of eligible beneficiaries only from 
June 2008 to June 2013, which makes it impossible to calculate the enrollment rates for 
2006 and 2007. Fortunately, the growth rate of Medicare eligible enrollees is pretty stable 
in the last five years. So the average growth rate is used here to calculate backward the 
Medicare eligible enrollees for the years 2006 and 2007. All data in this group comes from 
the CMS Medicare Advantage enrollment data.  
Table 3 provides summary data regarding the penetration rates of MA plans and 
the number of counties in the sample that offer at least one MA contract out of 1101 
MSA counties. It shows the penetration rate of HMO plans was about 12%, the 
penetration rate of PFFS was about 6%, and the enrollment rates of Local PPO and 
regional PPO were relatively small but increased significantly during the four years. The 
penetration rate of Coordinated Care Plans accounted for about 14%. 
5.2.2 County Characteristics 
The second group of explanatory variables is county characteristics, including 
median household income, population density, percent of eligible Medicaid enrollees 
over 65, three-year mortality rate for people over 65, hospital beds per 1,000 people, 
poverty rate, percentage of males, and so on. For the data on population density and 
median household income, this study puts the nature logarithms in as independent 
variables. All the county characteristic data are from Area Resource File (ARF, 2012-2013 
release). During this period, America went through an economic boom brought by 
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housing market, and the Great Recession due to the burst of housing bubble. So the 
county-level unemployment rate is also included to control for the potential influence of 
macroeconomic fluctuation.  Table 4 reports summary statistics for all county-level 
variables used in the Probit model to control for the county fixed effect. 
5.2.3 Patient Characteristics 
The third group of variables is patient characteristics, including race, age, and risk, 
where all the data also comes from MCBS. Because different patients have different 
admission conditions, we need to control for different diagnoses in order to use 
readmission to measure the quality of inpatient care. The claim files list each patient’s 
first three ICD-9 diagnosis codes.  I use the Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) Model 
to map each ICD-9 code to 1 of 70 HCCs. HCC coding is a payment model mandated in 
1997 by CMS and implemented in 2003 to identify individuals with serious or chronic 
illness. It assigns a value to each HCC to measure the risk.  
For example, for ICD-9 code 174.9 malignant neoplasm of breast (female), the 
corresponding HCC is 10 with an HCC weight of 0.187. The HCC weight could be used as 
an accurate value to control for each patient’s risk upon admission. So the average value 
of three recorded ICD-9 diagnosis HCC risk weights can be calculated for each patient.  
Table 5 gives the patient characteristic summary that lists all the variables used to control 
patient-level fixed effect. It shows the risk index ranges from 0 to 6.5, with an average of 
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0.7.  The case mix index is also included, which is a relative value assigned to a diagnosis 
related group (DRG) of patients in a Medicare care environment. 
5.2.4 Hospital Characteristics  
Hospital characteristics include several variables to control hospital ownership, 
quality and size of each hospital, in the model. Hospitals are usually categorized as not-
for-profit (NFP), for-profit (FP), or government institutions. Type of ownership plays an 
important role in determining the quality of hospital care. Shen (2002) examined the 
effect of ownership choice on patient outcomes after the treatment for acute myocardial 
infarction (AMI), using the data from the American Hospital Association Annual Survey 
and the Medicare hospital cost reports from 1985 to 1994. She concluded that for-proﬁt 
and government hospitals have a three to four percent higher incidence of adverse 
outcomes than not-for-proﬁt hospitals. Table 6 summarizes the hospital information, 
showing that not-for-profit, private hospitals take the highest percentage at 73 percent 
5.2.5 Instrument with Payment Rates 
 Recent studies point out that managed care penetration in a market is subject to 
endogeneity concerns, because missing variables may exist that are related to managed 
care penetration. To address this concern, this study uses data on payment from CMS to 
each MA plan in each county from 2006 to 2009. Beginning in 2006, the average monthly 
payment rate per county was used as the benchmark for plan bids. Table 7 shows the 
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variation in MA payment between the four types of plans over the four years. Payment 
rates for all four plan types increased. 
To prepare the entire data for regression, the data had to be merged. All the data 
from CMS and ARF comes with Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) and SSA 
county codes, so the penetration and competition data with area characteristics data can 
be merged using either FIPS or SSA. For Medicare quality and patient characteristics from 
MCBS data bank, the Medicare claim files for MCBS include inpatients’ hospital 
information, and CMS has a general hospital information file with each hospital’s location 
and hospital owner. The MCBS data with CMS data can thus be merged using the county 
name. All data merging work is accomplished by using SAS 9.3. 
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CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RELATED ISSUES  
In this section, the empirical models will be estimated using two different 
methods: 1) the simple Probit model without instrumental variables; 2) the Probit model 
with instruments using the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) method. The rationale for 
including the simple Probit model is to provide a basis for evaluating the extent to which 
the results are sensitive to the assumption that the penetration of Medicare Advantage 
plans are exogenous independent variables. 
6.1 Endogeneity Tests 
Recent research found that the penetration of county-level Medicare Advantage 
plans are endogenous, because there may exist unobserved time-varying county-level 
variables that are correlated with both the penetration of MA plans and the quality of 
traditional Medicare (Chernew et. al, 2008; Baicker et. al, 2013). Thus, it is necessary to 
test the endogeneity assumption before running the model, in order to get unbiased and 
efficient estimators. 
The exogeneity test in the 2SRI model arises from the second stage equation. In 
the second stage, the residuals from the auxiliary regressions are included as substituted 
for the unobserved variables. The most straightforward method to test exogeneity of the 
penetration rate can be constructed from the following null and alternative hypotheses: 
𝐻0: 𝛽𝑟 = 0  and 𝐻1: 𝛽𝑟 ≠ 0  where 𝛽𝑟  is the parameter estimate on 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖  from 
Equation 9. If the test statistic (in this case, the F test) is significantly different from zero, 
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then we can reject 𝐻0 and the assumption of exogeneity of the penetration rate of the 
four MA plans included in my model. 
Table 8 shows the results of endogeneity tests. 𝛽𝑟1 is the coefficient of residual for 
running the first stage regression of CCPs penetration rate, and 𝛽𝑟2 is the coefficient of 
residual for running the first stage regression of PFFS penetration rate. The regression 
result rejects the hypothesis that the penetration rates of either CCPs are exogenous at 
the 1% level. Thus, I assert that the exogeneity test results indicate that the penetration 
rate of the MA plans appear to be endogenous in the regression model. Then the new 
challenge in accounting for this endogeneity is to find a set of good instrumental variables 
for the Probit model. 
To correct the potential bias coming from endogeneity, instrumental variables (IV) 
are used to substitute the penetration of the Medicare Advantage plans. Chernew et al. 
(2008) used county-level payment rate from CMS to Medicare Advantage plans to identify 
the effect of the penetration of county-level Medicare Advantage plans. In order to satisfy 
the three conditions of good instrumental variables listed earlier, these payment rates 
should be correlated with county-level penetration, but not correlated with the quality of 
traditional Medicare. 
The assumption of the correlations between county-level penetration rates of MA 
plans and payment rates is reasonable. As Chernew et al. (2008) mentioned, increasing 
the payments will increase the profitability of the marginal enrollee, which will increase 
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profit incentives for more insurance companies to enter the MA market and offer more 
generous plans to increase enrollment. 
Next the county-level payment rates are tested to insure they are not related to 
the quality of traditional Medicare. As reviewed in Chapter 2, since 2003, Medicare has 
paid the highest of (1) an urban or rural floor payment; (2) 100 percent of risk-adjusted 
traditional Medicare FFS spending in the county (calculated using a five-year moving 
average lagged three years); (3) a minimum update over the prior year rate of 2 percent 
or traditional Medicare’s national expenditure growth rate, whichever was greater; or (4) 
a blended payment rate update. Beginning in 2006, Medicare started a bidding process 
for plan payments. The bids are compared to benchmark amounts set by the highest 
payment to the previous four choices. If a plan’s bid is higher than the benchmark, the 
payment equals the benchmark. If the bid is lower than the benchmark, the plan and 
Medicare split the difference between the bid and the benchmark. Thus, it is reasonable 
to assume that county-level payment rates are not correlated with quality indicators used 
in this research. 
While the assumption that county-level payment rates are good instrumental 
variables, the following conditions still need to be tested: 1) the instrumental variables 
are not significantly related with the explained variables; 2) the payment rates are not 
“weak” instruments. Empirically, the first condition can be test by adding the vector of 
payments in to Equation 1, as to the Equation (13). Then the coefficient vector 𝜃 is tested. 
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The regression result shows that the null hypothesis of 0 at the 5% level cannot be 
rejected. Then the first condition is test: the instrumental variables are not significantly 
related to the explained variables 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡𝛼1 + 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝜃 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛼2 + 𝑍𝑗𝑡𝛼3 + 𝐻𝑘𝑡𝛼4 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡𝛼5
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡                                                                                                                     (13) 
The strength of the instrumental set, as listed in the second condition, is tested by 
a standard F-test. All of three F-statistics (penetration rates of HMO, CCP and PFFS) are 
greater than 66, and a standard rule-of-thumb is that this F-statistic be greater than 10. 
Thus, the hypothesis that the instrumental variables are unrelated to county-level 
Medicare Advantage plans can be strongly rejected. Then the second condition is tested: 
the payment rates are not weak instruments.  Thus the instruments used in this paper 
satisfy the two conditions. 
6.2 First Stage Results  
Table 9 shows the results of the first stage estimation where observations are 
constructed at the county level, instead of individual patient level as used in the second 
stage regression. Instrumental variables must be tested in the county level, because there 
is a significant variation in MA enrollment by state and county, ranging from 49 percent in 
Minnesota to less than 1 percent in Alaska. Thus, different counties will have different 
numbers of patients, and a model conducted at the individual level will lead to over-
sampling for counties with more Medicare beneficiaries and under-sampling for counties 
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with fewer Medicare beneficiaries. The penetration rates of HMO, PFFS and CCP are 
tested, because HMO and CCP are used in the second stage to measure the penetration 
of Medicare Advantage plans, and PFFS is used as a comparison group. All the equations 
include the county and year fixed effect (as seen in Equation 14). 
 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡  =  𝛼0  +  𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑡𝛼1 + 𝑍𝑗𝑡𝛼4 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡𝛼6 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡               (14)    
The results suggest that an increase in payment to HMOs by $100 will increase the 
penetration rate of HMO by 13.8 percent. All the R2 value shows that the instruments are 
not weak. 
6.3 Parameter Estimates  
Table 10 presents the main results of the paper. Here, 30-day readmission is used 
as the quality indicator. Model one and Model two use standard Probit models without 
instruments, and Model three and Model four use Probit models with payment rates as 
the instrumental variables. To make the coefficients more meaningful, all coefficients are 
presented by explaining and measuring the marginal effect of each variable.  
In the Probit models, as presented in the first two columns, the estimated 
coefficients on either Medicare HMO or CCPs are larger (but smaller in absolute value) 
than the IV estimates in the last two columns. This result supports the endogeneity 
assumption that Medicare Advantage plan might enter into markets with relatively high 
cost growth in expenditures. 
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The first and the most important part of the results in Table 10 show that the 
expansion of MA plans (either HMO plans or CCP plans) has a significant negative effect 
on the probability of readmission. Specifically, the result in Model three shows that a 1 
percent higher HMO penetration rate will lead to 1.5 percent lower readmission rate. 
Results in Model four show that a 1% increase in CCP is related to a 1.265 percent lower 
readmission rate. The market share of PFFS has a negative but not significant effect on 
the probability of readmission.  
The second part of the regression table presents the results of patient 
characteristics. For the age of patient variable, the controlling group is ages higher than 
84. It shows that the younger group has a lower, but not significant, probability of 
readmission. Another interesting variable is self-assessment of health condition. The 
control group is in bad health. It shows that the better health condition group has a lower 
rate of readmission, and the results are significant. Compared to patients in bad health, 
patients reporting excellent health have 8.75 percent lower 30-day readmission rate. The 
last important and strongly significant variables are risk index and DRG weight. The risk is 
calculated from the diagnosis code for each patient. Higher risk is related with higher 
probability of readmission; if the patient’s risk increases by 1 percent, the probability of 
readmission will increase by 3 percent.  
The third part of the result shows the year fixed effect.  Compared to 2006, the 
three following years have higher readmission rates, and the years of 2008 and 2009 are 
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significantly higher than 2006. In other words, hospital care quality had been getting 
worse over this four-year period.  
The next section describes how county characteristics affect hospital quality. 
Counties with low population density and high household income tend to have higher 
hospital care quality. In addition, compared to counties in the Eastern U.S., counties 
located in the West have lower hospital care quality. 
Last but not least is the influence of hospital characteristics. As mentioned before, 
the type of hospital ownership plays an important role in determining the quality of 
hospital care. As shown in table 10, compared with non-profit, private hospitals, patients 
discharged from government-owned hospitals have 2.69 perecent lower probability of 
readmission.  
6.4 Alternative Indicators of Quality Measurement 
In this section, alternative dependent variables are used to measure the quality, 
such as the 60-day readmission rate and 90-day readmission rate. The results in table 11 
show that a 1 percent higher CCP share can decrease the 60-day readmission rate by 1.08 
percent, and can decrease the 90-day readmission rate by 1.16 percent. Thus, the results 
are robust and it is safe to conclude that the expansion of MA plans could positively affect 
health care quality, using readmission rate as the quality indicator. 
54 
 
 
6.5 Chronic Conditions 
Most previous research measures quality by considering one specific disease to 
control for the complexity of assessing a variety of different diseases. In this section, the 
sample is restricted to patients who report having one of four chronic conditions, 
including hypertension, cancer, stroke and diabetes. The regression results in table 12 
show that a 1 percent increase in CCP plan penetration rate can reduce the 30-day 
readmission rate by 0.99 percent for patients with hypertension; by 3.11 percent for 
patients with cancer; and by 1.38 percent for patients with stroke. However, for patients 
with diabetes, even though the quality is negatively related to the expansion rate, the 
relationship is not significant 10 percent. 
6.6 Selection Effect Test 
The measurement of spillover effects may be affected by selection bias, meaning 
the choice between traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage plans is not random. A 
common concern is whether relatively healthier beneficiaries are more likely to choose 
fee-for-service Medicare. If so, the quality for those remaining in the fee-for-service will 
decrease, since healthier enrollees who were previously enrolled in fee-for-service plans 
may switch to MA plans and enrollees under worse health condition who were previously 
enrolled in MA plans may switch to fee-for-service plans. The existence of possible 
selection bias could definitely affect the spillover effect measured in this paper. 
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Fortunately, since patient characteristic information is available in the MCBS data, 
patient characteristics variables are included in my model to control patient’s fixed effect.  
Thus, there is no selection bias concern in this research. Out of interest, though, I tested 
the compositional change by regressing the Medicare Advantage plans penetration and 
various demographic and health-related variables in this section. As Chernew, et. al., 
(2008) did, I replacedthe dependent variable with age and health-rated measures to see 
whether the penetration rates are related to patient characteristics (see Equation 15). In 
my main model, I have dozens of variables about patient characteristics. To simplify the 
analysis, focused on cancer, risk, DRG weight, stroke and diabetes as the dependent 
variables. 
 𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡𝛼1 + 𝑍𝑗𝑡𝛼2 + 𝐻𝑘𝑡𝛼3 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡𝛼3 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡         (15)     
The results in table 13 show that none of the coefficients of either CCP share or 
PFFS share are significant. Thus, there exists no systematic evidence of selection bias in 
the model, which is the same conclusion as Chernew et. al., (2008). 
6.7 Explanation of the Findings 
The major purpose of this empirical study is to better understand how the 
penetration rates of Medicare Advantage plans will spill over into the traditional 
Medicare sector, considering the rapid growth of MA plans in recent years. Specifically, it 
investigates whether the expansion of MA plans will affect the quality of health care for 
patients remaining in the traditional Medicare sector. To answer the question whether 
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government should continue to support the development of MA plans, a Probit model 
with instrumental variable method is applied to run the regression, and patient 
characteristics are well controlled to avoid selection bias. 
The regression results suggest that the increasing Medicare Advantage 
penetration can reduce the hospital readmission rate. Using payment rates from CMS to 
MA plans as instrumental variables, I find that a 1 percent increase in CCP penetration 
rate will lead to a 1.13 percent reduction of 30-day readmission in the traditional 
Medicare sector. Because lower readmission is always favored by patients and considered 
a sign of higher quality care, the expansion of MA plans has a strong and significant 
positive spillover effect on the quality of hospital care in the traditional Medicare sector. 
The same conclusions can be reached if considering the expansion of HMO plans, which a 
1 percent increase in HMO penetration will lead to a 1.52 percent reduction of 30-day 
readmission rate for patients with traditional Medicare plan. 
Several alternative models are built to test the robustness. First, using alternative 
indicators of quality (60-day readmission and 90-day readmission), a similar conclusion of 
the positive spillover effects is reached. Second, many related studies chose to test the 
spillover effect by limiting the sample to patients with specific diseases. To follow their 
methods, I conducted a robust test by using four common chronic conditions 
(hypertension, cancer, stroke and diabetes), and find that the expansion of MA plans has 
a negative effect on the 30-day readmission rate for patients with one of the four chronic 
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conditions, even though the effects are at different scales. Lastly, this research used 
MCBS data with detailed patient characteristics to test the selection bias of whether 
patients enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans are self-selected. Running patient 
characteristics (especially the risk index) with penetration rates controlling county and 
hospital fixed effect, resulting in finding that the penetration rate of CCP plans is not 
related to patient characteristics, which means there is no selection bias. 
Since lower readmission rate is always considered an important indicator of higher 
hospital quality, we can assert that the expansion of Medicare Advantage plans can 
positively spill over to the traditional Medicare sector. As reviewed in Chapter 3, this 
significant positive spillover effect may come from either the physician’s practice patterns, 
or through the adoption of shared advanced technology. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
Medicare Advantage plan enrollment has expanded rapidly in recent years, and 
this rapid growth has attracted the attention of policymakers and researchers to test the 
effectiveness and efficiency of these plans compared to tradition Medicare plans. This 
paper is designed to address the question of whether increasing MA plan enrollment is 
associated with the quality of hospital care received by fee-for-service Medicare patients, 
by constructing the 30-day readmission rate as the quality indicator. 
By using the most recent enrollment data and individual MCBS data, this 
dissertation has found a statistically significant and beneficial relationship between the 
MA penetration in a county and the rate of readmissions to local hospitals. Specifically, 
the results show that a 1 percent increase in the Coordinated Care Plan penetration rate 
can reduce the 30-day readmission rate by 1.13 percent, reduce 60-day readmission rates 
by 1.08 percent, and reduce the 90-day readmission rate by 1.12 percent. Since lower 
rates of hospital readmission are widely accepted as an indicator of higher quality, it is 
safe to conclude that the expansion of Medicare Advantage plans has had a substantial 
beneficial spillover effect on the quality of inpatient care received by beneficiaries under 
traditional Medicare. In addition, when the sample is restricted to patients with specific 
chronic conditions and 60-day and 90-day readmission rates are used as quality indicators, 
a similar conclusion is reached. Thus, the positive spillover effect is robust. Finally, the 
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selection bias is tested with the individual data from MCBS, and finds no significant 
selection bias, which is consistent with most recent studies. 
The findings in this paper are consistent with most recent related research on the 
spillover effects of MA penetration. Baicker et al. (2013), for example, found that greater 
managed care penetration is associated with lower costs and shorter stays per 
hospitalization.  
The findings in the research presented here provide strong empirical support for 
the continued development of Medicare Advantage plans. The positive spillover effects 
from the managed care expansion to improve the quality of fee-for-service beneficiaries 
can lead to several important policy implications for the Medicare program. When the 
Medicare Advantage plans are evaluated in the future, the policy makers should not only 
consider the direct effects on beneficiaries under MA plans, but also the possible spillover 
effects. According to the results found here, the government should continue to 
encourage enrollment in Medicare Advantage plans by increasing the payment to MA 
plans. 
There are several limitations in this research. First, as mentioned earlier, quality of 
care has numerous dimensions. Using readmission rate as the only quality indicator may 
lead to measurement bias. Future research can focus on other types of utilization and 
different measures of the quality of care, and test whether the expansion of MA plans will 
only spill over to sections of the hospital’s quality measurements or to overall quality. 
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Second, the research period for this paper is 2006-2009, which is before the 
implementation of the Affordable Care Act of 2010. Future work should also seek to 
evaluate the spillover effect of MA after 2010, when the payments to MA plans are totally 
different. Finally, future research might investigate whether the expansion of MA plans 
will affect competition among hospitals, considering that competitiveness could also have 
a spillover effect on the quality of hospital care.  
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FIGURE 1 DISTRIBUTION OF MA COUNTY-LEVEL MONTHLY PAYMENT RATES1 
 
Note: the payment rate after 2012 is the average value of the program’s five-star quality 
rating. All payment rates are the nominal value, no inflation-adjustment is applied. 
SOURCE:  CMS, Medicare Advantage (MA) Ratebook files, located online at 
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Health-Plans/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Ratebooks-
and-Supporting-Data.html. 
  
                                                            
1 The graph is a boxplot to depict the payment rates in all counties through their quartiles. 
The green rectangle spans the first quartile to the medium, and the purple rectangle 
spans the medium to the third quartile. The lower bound describes the minimum 
payment rate, and the upper bound describes the maximum payment rate. 
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FIGURE 2 ENROLLMENT (IN MILLIONS) IN MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS, 1985-2003 
 
 
Note: Data for the number of enrollmees includes local Coordinated Care Plans (risk-
based HMOs plus PPOs), Provider Sponsored Organization, private Fee-For-Service (from 
2001), regional PPOs (from 2006), and other available MA plans. 
SOURCE:  CMS, Medicare Advantage Plans Monthly Reports Files and Data, located online 
at http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/HealthPlanRepFileData/Monthly.html. All data are from December of the year 
indicated, except 2007, which is from November. 
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FIGURE 3 ENROLLMENT IN MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS, BY PLAN TYPE, 2006 -2013 
 
Note: “Others” includes cost and demonstration plans. 
SOURCE:  CMS, Medicare Advantage/Part D Contract and Enrollment Data, Monthly 
Contract and Enrollment Summary Report. All data are from June of the year indicated, 
except 2006, which is from October, and 2013, which is from May. 
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FIGURE 4 MONTHLY CONTRACT SUMMARY REPORT 
 
SOURCE:  CMS, Medicare Advantage/Part D Contract and Enrollment Data, Monthly 
Contract and Enrollment Summary Report. All data are from July of the year indicated, 
except 2008, which is from June, and 2014, which is from February. 
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FIGURE 5 AVAILABILITY OF MA PLANS AND PLAN TYPES 
 
SOURCE:  CMS, Medicare Advantage/Part D Contract and Enrollment Data, Monthly 
Contract and Enrollment Summary Report. All data are from June of the year indicated, 
except 2006, which is from October, and 2013, which is from May. 
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TABLE 1 ENROLLMENT WITHIN MSA AND ALL COUNTIES LEVEL ACROSS PLAN SUMMARY 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
HMO MSA 5155605 5283708 5733023 6171799 22344135 
All 5668255 5849551 6363491 6841016 24722313 
Percent 90.96% 90.33% 90.09% 90.22% 90.38% 
Private 
PFFS 
MSA 546444 1071179 1519475 1633770 4770868 
All 810277 1541356 2184014 2351523 6887170 
Percent 67.44% 69.50% 69.57% 69.48% 69.27% 
Local 
PPO 
MSA 284335 332775 537102 767148 1921360 
All 325952 388712 640504 926224 2281392 
Percent 87.23% 85.61% 83.86% 82.83% 84.22% 
Regional 
PPO 
MSA 73339 120145 207222 304914 705620 
All 87008 148765 274292 415653 925718 
Percent 84.29% 80.76% 75.55% 73.36% 76.22% 
 
Note: percent equals the ratio of enrollment in MSA over the total enrollment. 
SOURCE:  CMS, Medicare Advantage/Part D Contract and Enrollment Data, Monthly 
Contract and Enrollment Summary Report. All data are from June of the year indicated, 
except 2006, which is from October. 
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TABLE 2 READMISSION RATE SUMMARY 
 30-day 
Readmission rate 
60-day 
Readmission rate 
90-day 
Readmission rate 
2006 Mean 0.2302 0.2852 0.3084 
N 1912 1779 1619 
2007 Mean 0.2252 0.2955 0.3267 
N 1999 1859 1715 
2008 Mean 0.2408 0.3039 0.3285 
N 1874 1755 1581 
2009 Mean 0.2152 0.2718 0.3052 
N 1547 1420 1255 
Average Mean 0.2284 0.2900 0.3180 
N 7332 6813 6170 
 
Note: Column “Mean” measures the readmission rate, Column “N” measures the number 
of observations. 
Source: MCBS claims data, 2006-2009. 
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TABLE 3 MA PENETRATION RATE SUMMARY 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average 
HMO share Mean 0.1244 0.1148 0.1156 0.1206 0.1187 
N 648 703 777 806 734 
PFFS share Mean 0.0357 0.0530 0.0698 0.0716 0.0580 
N 1001 1075 1086 1085 1062 
Local PPO 
share 
Mean 0.0155 0.0176 0.0243 0.0321 0.0234 
N 477 490 591 702 565 
Regional 
PPO share 
Mean 0.0040 0.0062 0.0094 0.0129 0.009 
N 387 550 711 854 626 
 
Note: Column “Mean” measures the average penetration rate across counties, Column “N” 
measures the number of counties that have MA enrollment out of 1101 MSA counties. 
Source: CMS data, Medicare Advantage/Part D Contract and Enrollment data, 2006-2009. 
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mortality_~e 4851 0.0460742 0.0054573 0.033235 0.062451 
unemployme~e 4851 5.806164 2.275088 2.3 14 
bed_rate 4851 3.759325 1.827867 0 15.8852 
lnpop_dens~y 4851 6.801736 1.358753 2.91235 11.1733 
lnmedian_i~e 4851 10.83455 0.205482 10.3577 11.4601 
per_male 4851 0.4901084 0.0105569 0.465634 0.524712 
per_white 4851 0.779139 0.1270935 0.281051 0.968427 
per_black 4851 0.154533 0.1256461 0.002864 0.65559 
poverty_rate 4851 13.51901 4.32555 4.1 28.9 
medicaid_r~e 4851 0.1498616 0.0795238 0.030247 0.429532 
midwest 4851 0.2327355 0.4226186 0 1 
northeast 4851 0.1894455 0.3919025 0 1 
west 4851 0.1480107 0.3551472 0 1 
nursing 4851 3.179169 1.087905 0 5.926926 
per_under12 4851 0.1990613 0.0248154 0.124691 0.258699 
per1519 4851 0.0695888 0.0084634 0.043776 0.091345 
per2024 4851 0.069435 0.0144597 0.043085 0.142264 
per2544 4851 0.2748526 0.031104 0.191062 0.37928 
per4564 4851 0.2550197 0.0226514 0.195628 0.309481 
  
Source: AHRF data, 2006-2009 
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TABLE 4 PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS SUMMARY 
Variable obs mean std min max 
Age 65-69 4851 0.1245104 0.330197 0 1 
Age 70-74 4851 0.1535766 0.3605796 0 1 
Age 75-79 4851 0.1781076 0.3826427 0 1 
Age 80-84 4851 0.2236652 0.4167432 0 1 
Male 4851 0.4197073 0.4935618 0 1 
White 4851 0.8499278 0.3571789 0 1 
Black 4851 0.1106988 0.3137912 0 1 
Obese 4851 0.2510823 0.4336804 0 1 
Underweight 4851 0.0486498 0.2151569 0 1 
Excellent health condition 4851 0.0414348 0.1993141 0 1 
Very good health condition 4851 0.1504844 0.3575825 0 1 
Good health condition 4851 0.3073593 0.4614471 0 1 
Fair health condition 4851 0.3052979 0.460581 0 1 
Smoker 4851 0.0808081 0.2725682 0 1 
Hypertension 4851 0.7429396 0.437058 0 1 
Myocardial 4851 0.2292311 0.4203815 0 1 
Ever told had angina pectoris 4851 0.2174809 0.4125749 0 1 
Heart conditions 4851 0.180169 0.3843678 0 1 
Stroke 4851 0.1945991 0.3959325 0 1 
Cancer 4851 0.2438672 0.4294578 0 1 
Diabetes 4851 0.312719 0.4636487 0 1 
ADL helpers 4851 0.7730365 0.418912 0 1 
Less than high school 4851 0.3230262 0.4676808 0 1 
High school 4851 0.280973 0.4495207 0 1 
Some college 4851 0.2446918 0.4299486 0 1 
College 4851 0.151309 0.3583868 0 1 
Married 4851 0.4252731 0.4944353 0 1 
Widowed 4851 0.4458874 0.4971144 0 1 
Divorced 4851 0.0762729 0.2654617 0 1 
Separated 4851 0.0098949 0.0989898 0 1 
Number of children living 4851 2.85838 2.46115 0 17 
Work 4851 0.0385488 0.1925367 0 1 
Distance from hospital 4851 35.99905 188.3992 0 2601.94 
Risk index 4851 0.7036217 0.7778851 0 6.525 
Case mix index 4851 1.466282 0.4069369 0 2.62649 
DRG weights 4851 1.553604 1.899402 0 26.0295 
Source: MCBS claim data, 2006-2009. 
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TABLE 5 HOSPITAL CHARACTERISTICS SUMMARY 
Variable obs mean std min max 
Government owned hospital  4851 0.1207998 0.3259281 0 1 
Private hospital-for profit 4851 0.14698 0.3541225 0 1 
Private hospital-none profit 4851 0.7322202 0.4428479 0 1 
# of staff bed 4851 5.72986 0.7426472 2.079442 7.718241 
# of admission 4851 9.608665 0.870272 5.488938 11.53239 
Inpatient days (log) 4851 11.23706 0.8514316 6.542472 13.46453 
# of employees 4851 7.236669 0.9390539 3.496508 9.77127 
Teaching hospitals 4851 0.4627912 0.498665 0 1 
# of birth (log) 4851 6.16349 3.085674 0 9.446361 
Staffed bassinets 4851 2.639207 1.420773 0 5.003946 
Emergency outpatient visits 4851 10.4265 2.016519 0 12.50061 
Total outpatient visits  4851 12.04554 1.432899 0 14.84513 
# of operating rooms 4851 2.255992 1.226965 0 4.574711 
ICU beds 4851 2.505196 1.327045 0 5.278115 
Total employee equivalent 4851 7.414616 0.9033796 4.060443 9.706438 
  
Source: AHA survey data, 2006-2009. 
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TABLE 6 MA PAYMENT RATE SUMMARY 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 
HMO Mean 649.15 687.41 697.37 712.98 687.58 
N 752 762 806 832 788 
PFFS Mean 660.20 691.84 722.66 778.73 714.47 
N 1011 1097 1098 1100 1077 
Local PPO Mean 677.18 717.68 716.99 741.23 716.50 
N 462 486 575 700 556 
Regional 
PPO  
Mean 712.79 731.14 751.51 754.13 742.00 
N 385 500 651 865 600 
 
Note: Column “Mean” measures the average payment rate in dollar from CMS across 
counties, Column “N” measures the number of counties that has payment data for Part C 
Plans out of 1101 MSA counties. 
Source: CMS data, Medicare Advantage Plan payment data items, details for 2006-2009. 
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  TABLE 7 ENDOGENEITY TEST RESULTS 
 Value Standard 
deviation 
P-value 
𝛽𝑟1 3.275 1.129 0.004 
𝛽𝑟2 3.567 3.032 0.240 
 
Note: 𝛽𝑟1 is the coefficient of residual from regressing CCP penetration rate on the 
instrument variables and all exogenous; 𝛽𝑟2 is the coefficient of residual from regressing 
PFFS penetration rate on the instrument variables and all exogenous. 
I use F-test to test the null hypothesis that both 𝛽𝑟1 =0 and 𝛽𝑟2=0, p-value equals to 
0.0033. Thus we can reject the null hypothesis, and, endogeneity does exist.  
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TABLE 8 FIRST STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS 
Independent Variables CCP Share HMO Share PFFS Share 
Payment Rates 
Payment to HMO 0.0000163 0.0000138 0.0000544 ** 
Payment to PFFS 0.0000538 0.0000707 -0.0000105 
Payment to Local PPO -6.95E-06 -0.0000274 -6.19E-06 
Payment to Regional PPO 0.0000699 *** 0.0000607 ** 1.09E-06 
County Characteristic 
Mortality Rate -2.004243 -1.521831 -1.560804 
Unemployment Rate -0.0090469 ** -0.0093525 ** 0.0013839 
Bed Rate -0.0057532 -0.0056966 0.0017704 
Population Density (Log) 0.0108253 0.0135145 -0.001064 
Median Household Income  -0.3546022 *** -0.2900124 *** -0.0661825 ** 
Percent Of Male -0.7224788 -0.7317879 -0.7493864 
Percent Of White 0.1244474 0.092407 0.057716 
Percent Of Black 0.1550378 0.140985 -0.0655995 
Poverty Rate -0.0047092 -0.0033271 -0.0025355 
Medicaid Rate -0.302091 ** -0.2693379 * 0.046946 
Midwest -0.0308311 -0.0242106 0.0289406 *** 
Northeast 0.1203201 *** 0.1121536 *** -0.0367538 *** 
West 0.1973037 *** 0.199178 *** -0.023272 ** 
# Of Skilled Nursing Facilities 0.0374035 ** 0.0368966 *** -0.0165662 *** 
% Of Population Under12 0.41027 0.7150216 -0.0351964 
% Of Population 15-19 -0.4082836 -1.6589 2.36565 *** 
% Of Population 20-24 0.7603183 1.094993 -0.680421 
% Of Population 25-44 0.4600376 0.183801 0.5255639 *** 
% Of Population 45-64 1.034376 0.8290734 0.3499746 
Hospital Characteristics 
Private Hospital-For Profit 0.0289512 0.0212583 0.0163484 ** 
Private Hospital-Not For 
Profit 
0.0096118 0.0018352 0.0139672 ** 
# Of Staff Bed 0.0425783 ** 0.0244508 -0.0180613 *** 
# Of Admission 0.0077667 0.0119982 -0.0171068 ** 
Inpatient Days (Log) -0.0209533 -0.0080241 0.0182294 ** 
# Of Employees 0.0879277 ** 0.0871206 ** -0.0096697 
Teaching Hospitals 0.0069533 0.0116155 -0.0014008 
# Of Birth (Log) -0.0027573 -0.0032734 -0.0010881 
Staffed Bassinets 0.0002138 0.0006958 0.0017353 
Emergency Outpatient Visits 0.0006972 0.0008031 0.002642 ** 
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Total Outpatient Visits  -0.0017373 -0.0021914 0.0003405 
# Of Operating Rooms 0.001544 0.0039934 0.002946 
ICU Beds 0.0011917 ** -0.0004989 -0.002674 
Total Employee Equivalent -0.1082818 *** -0.1083846 *** 0.0197868 * 
    
Patient Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
R-squared .6043 .5960 .5320 
 
Note: Dependent variables are CCP market share, HMO market share, and PFFS market 
share, which range from 0 to 1. The model is clustered by county. 
∗ Significant at 10% level.  
∗∗ Significant at 5% level.  
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level. 
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TABLE 9 MAIN REGRESSION RESULTS—30-DAY READMISSION RATE 
 Probit Model 
Without Instruments 
Probit Model 
With Instruments 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Market Penetration 
CCP Share -0.1784 ***  -1.1324 ***  
HMO Share  -0.1661 **  -1.5158 *** 
PFFS Share -0.0849 -0.0738 -1.1033 -0.8012 
Patient Characteristics 
Age 65-69 -0.0283 -0.0288 -0.0277 -0.0321 
Age 70-74 0.0149 0.0148 0.0187 0.0195 
Age 75-79 -0.0055 -0.0057 0.0045 0.0063 
Age 80-84 0.0084 0.0083 0.0104 0.0091 
Male 0.0134 0.0132 0.0129 0.0116 
White -0.0131 -0.0128 -0.0164 -0.0231 
Black -0.0318 -0.0312 -0.0524 -0.0642 
Obese 0.0244 0.0242 0.0307 ** 0.0321 ** 
Underweight -0.0022 -0.0018 0.0045 0.006 
Excellent Health Condition -0.0843 ** -0.0845 ** -0.0875 ** -0.0932 ** 
Very Good Health Condition -0.0855 *** -0.0856 *** -0.0837 *** -0.0847 *** 
Good Health Condition -0.0161 -0.0163 -0.0165 -0.0196 
Fair Health Condition -0.0382 ** -0.0384 ** -0.0311 * -0.0302 * 
Smoker 0.0326 0.0333 0.0165 0.0171 
Hypertension 0.0337 ** 0.0335 ** 0.0363 ** 0.0363 ** 
Myocardial -0.0115 -0.0113 -0.0122 -0.0114 
Ever Told Had Angina Pectoris -0.0036 -0.0039 0.0029 0.0028 
Heart Conditions 0.0214 0.0217 0.0181 0.0204 
Stroke -0.026 -0.0256 -0.0224 -0.0183 
Cancer -0.002 -0.0019 -0.0066 -0.0061 
Diabetes 0.0089 0.009 0.0075 0.0085 
ADL helpers 0.033** 0.0328 * 0.0356 ** 0.0348 ** 
Less Than High School -0.0076 -0.0075 0.0001 0.0028 
High School -0.0395 * -0.0396 * -0.0327 -0.0331 
Some College -0.0003 -0.0003 0.00327 0.0048 
Married 0.0474 0.0476 0.0422 0.0359 
Widowed 0.0507 0.0507 0.0432 0.0352 
Divorced 0.0543 0.0544 0.0532 0.0517 
Separated 0.0884 0.088 0.0644 0.0411 
Number Of Children Living 0.0007 0.0006 0.0018 0.0017 
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Work -0.0659 * -0.066 * -0.0674 * -0.0668 * 
Distance From Hospital -2.06E-05 -2.06E-05 -3.13E-06 5.94E-06 
Risk Index 0.0313 *** 0.0313 *** 0.0316 *** 0.0322 *** 
Case Mix Index 0.0351 0.0341 0.0452 * 0.0397 
DRG Weights 0.0105 *** 0.0106 *** 0.0102 *** 0.0099 *** 
Weekday 0.0162 0.0163 0.0133 0.013 
Date Factor (Compare To 2006) 
Year 2007 -0.0016 -0.0022 0.0138 0.003 
Year 2008 0.031 0.0285 0.0823 *** 0.0685 ** 
Year 2009 0.0097 0.0055 0.0895 ** 0.079 * 
County Characteristic 
Mortality Rate -0.0724 0.0925 -4.6096 -3.8462 
Unemployment Rate -0.0001 -1.29E-05 -0.0048 -0.0096 
Bed Rate 0.0005 0.0007 -0.0053 -0.0069 
Population Density (Log) 0.024 * 0.0239 * 0.0382 *** 0.0451 *** 
Median Household Income  -0.0934 -0.0762 -0.5042 *** -0.5087 *** 
Percent Of Male -0.919 -0.909 -2.0852 -2.0255 
Percent Of White 0.2838 0.2747 0.5427 * 0.555 * 
Percent Of Black 0.2467 0.2418 0.4047 0.4863 
Poverty Rate -0.0062 -0.0059 -0.0126 ** -0.0114 ** 
Medicaid Rate -0.0292 -0.0132 -0.3284 * -0.3348 ** 
Midwest -0.0006 0.0006 -0.00008 -0.0085 
Northeast 0.0058 0.0031 0.0882 0.1275 ** 
West 0.048 0.0461 0.2098 *** 0.2932 *** 
# Of Skilled Nursing Facilities 0.0082 0.0074 0.0389 * 0.0561 ** 
% Of Population Under12 -0.12 -0.0574 0.044 0.7836 
% Of Population 15-19 2.4535 2.1754 5.159 2.1103 
% Of Population 20-24 -0.188 -0.1135 -0.135 0.9371 
% Of Population 25-44 0.2821 0.214 1.362 * 0.8247 
% Of Population 45-64 -0.4563 -0.5111 0.9369 0.8423 
Hospital Characteristics  
Government Owned 
Hospital  
-0.0269 -0.0255 -0.0481 * -0.0351 
Private Hospital-For Profit 0.0099 0.0096 0.0346 0.0398 
# Of Staff Bed 0.0087 0.0057 0.034 0.031 
# Of Admission -0.0744 ** -0.0735 ** -0.0866 ** -0.0739 ** 
Inpatient Days (Log) 0.0469 0.0486 0.0518 0.0603 
# Of Employees 0.113 * 0.111 * 0.1992 *** 0.2413 *** 
Teaching Hospitals 0.0146 0.0154 0.02 0.0316 * 
# Of Birth (Log) 0.0046 0.0046 0.0028 0.0024 
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Staffed Bassinets -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0068 -0.0093 
Emergency Outpatient Visits 0.0045 0.0045 0.007 0.0066 
Total Outpatient Visits  0.0013 0.0013 -0.0002 -0.001 
# Of Operating Rooms 0.0127 0.013 0.0182 0.0212 * 
ICU Beds -0.0059 -0.006 -0.0095 -0.0106 
Total Employee Equivalent -0.1414 ** -0.1394 ** -0.2393 *** -0.297 *** 
 
Note:  
1. The dependent variable is a binary variable to measure 30-day readmission: when it 
equals to one, there is a readmission within 30 days; when it equals to zero, there is no 
readmission within 30 days. 
2. All value in the table measures marginal effect of each explaining variable. 
3. The sample size is 4,851, with four-year periods. 
∗ Significant at 10% level.  
∗∗ Significant at 5% level.  
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level.  
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TABLE 10 ROBUST TEST 
Independent 
Variables 
60-day Readmission 
Rate 
90-day Readmission 
Rate 
CCP share -1.0786 *** -1.1157*** 
PFFS share -.7910 .2485 
Risk Adjusters Yes Yes 
County FEs Yes Yes 
Hospital FEs Yes Yes 
Year FEs Yes Yes 
   
Pseudo R2 0.0347 0.037 
 
Note:  
1. The two binary variables of 60-day and 90-day readmission rates are used as quality 
indicators. 
2. All value in the table measures marginal effect of each explaining variable. 
3. The sample sizes are 4,337 and 3,798, respectively, with four-year periods. 
∗ Significant at 10% level.  
∗∗ Significant at 5% level.  
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level.  
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TABLE 11 CHRONIC CONDITIONS 
Independent 
Variables 
Hypertension Cancer Stroke Diabetes 
CCP Share -.9947  ** -3.1051 *** -1.3804 * -.3986 
PFFS Share -.8708 -.713 1.967545 -1.3028 
  
Readmission Rate                            26.03%              25.44%                          24.15%                   27.42% 
 
Note:  
1. The dependent variable is a binary variable to measure 30-day readmission: when it 
equals to one, there is a readmission within 30 days; when it equals to zero, there is no 
readmission within 30 days. 
2. All values in the table measure the marginal effect of each explaining variable. 
3. The sample sizes are 3604, 1183, 944 and 1517, respectively, with four-year periods. 
∗ Significant at 10% level.  
∗∗ Significant at 5% level.  
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level.  
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TABLE 12 SELECTION BIAS TEST 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:   
1. The dependent variables of Cancer, Stroke, and Diabetes are binary variables, where I 
use the Probit model to measure the marginal effect. The dependent variables of Risk and 
DRG weights are continuous variables, where I use the OLS model to estimate the 
coefficients. 
2. The sample size is 4,851, with four-year periods. 
3. All value in the parenthesis measures t-statistic. 
∗ Significant at 10% level.  
∗∗ Significant at 5% level.  
∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level.  
Dependent Variables CCP share PFFS share 
Cancer -.851472 
(-2.59) 
-.8559415 
(-0.96) 
Risk -.0916663 
(-0.15) 
1.854472 
(1.61) 
DRG weights .1811279 
(0.12) 
.4704402 
(0.12) 
Stroke -.190593 
(0.62) 
1.405834 
(1.73) 
Diabetes .2944518 
(0.85) 
-.8761858 
(-0.95) 
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ABSTRACT 
SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS: DOES THE MARKET 
PENETRATION OF PLANS AFFECT HOSPITAL CARE QUALITY? 
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Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
The percentage of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Advantage (MA) 
plans increased from 12 percent in 2003 to 28 percent in 2013 out of the roughly 50 
million Medicare enrollees. Although Medicare beneficiaries are increasingly choosing MA 
plans, little is known about whether and how the market penetration of these plans affect 
the quality of hospital care provided to Medicare beneficiaries. This issue is extremely 
important to policy makers when they try to evaluate the importance and effectiveness of 
current Medicare policy, like the Affordable Care Act. This paper examines the spillover 
effect on the quality of hospital care under traditional Medicare plans in response to the 
local market penetration of MA plans, such as MA health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs), MA preferred provider organizations (PPOs), and MA private fee-for-service 
(PFFS) plans. Using nationally representative data from the 2006 to 2009 Medicare 
Current Beneficiary Survey and enrollment data from CMS, this study shows that higher 
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Medicare Advantage plan penetrations are associated with lower readmission. I conclude 
that the expansion of Medicare Advantage plans has a positive spillover effect on quality 
of care received by individuals enrolled in traditional Medicare plans. 
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